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1 Introduction 
In this paper we study cooperation in social dilemma situations using an 
experimental public goods game. In contrast to most of the previous work, we let subjects 
decide endogenously on the institutions governing their interactions. In particular, subjects 
can vote on whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism 
(VCM) with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other subjects or whether they prefer 
to use the standard VCM. We find that the endogenous institutional choice has a large and 
positive effect on cooperation levels in the public goods game compared to a setting in 
which these institutions have been determined exogenously (by the experimenter). This 
suggests that participation rights foster cooperation, even beyond the level that can be 
achieved through reward and punishment when these institutions have been implemented 
exogenously. 
By varying the effectiveness of the available punishment or reward technology 
(defined as the ratio of monetary consequences of being punished or rewarded to the costs 
of punishing or rewarding), we are able to show that the reward option is chosen almost 
exclusively when reward or punishment are highly effective, i.e. have a high ratio. 
However, the standard VCM is the preferred institution when the technology is less 
effective. The punishment option – though very effective in raising contributions – is only 
very rarely chosen endogenously, indicating that most subjects prefer an institutional 
environment without punishment. 
We compare our results to predictions based on standard game theoretic analysis 
(under the assumptions of rationality and selfishness) and predictions derived from two 
prominent social preference models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Charness and Rabin, 
2002). While the standard game theoretic model essentially fails to explain contributions 
and institutional choices, the models with social preferences are able to predict many, but 
not all behavioral regularities in our experiment. In particular, the inequity aversion model 
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) largely fails to account for the observed behavior under the 
reward institution, whereas the model of Charness and Rabin (2002) can only explain the 
power of the punishment institution for increasing cooperation when punishment is 
exclusively driven by reciprocity. 
Our paper is related to a large number of studies dealing with the conditions and 
institutions that foster cooperation in social dilemma situations. In recent years, the effects 
of reward and especially of punishment on cooperation in social dilemma games have 
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received considerable attention, for instance in Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Andreoni et 
al. (2003), Masclet et al. (2003), or Sefton et al. (2007). These and most subsequent papers 
discussed in the next section share the feature that the institution governing the interaction 
of subjects has been determined exogenously by the experimenters. Although these studies 
have provided illuminating and very important insights into the determinants of 
cooperation in groups, they are unable to answer two straightforward questions that are 
central to our paper: (1) Which institutions do subjects actually prefer and choose 
themselves in a social dilemma? (2) How does the endogenous choice of rules affect group 
members’ interaction and their level of cooperation? The answers to both questions are 
important in order to judge whether the inferences about the treatment effects of different – 
but exogenously imposed – institutions are reliable and can be generalized to situations 
where subjects can self-select or avoid certain institutions through an endogenous choice. 
In real life, groups often establish themselves the (explicit or implicit) rules that 
govern their interaction in social dilemmas. On a large-scale international level, for 
instance, one might think of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the so-called Kyoto-protocol, or the United Nations Security Council. 
Representatives in these organizations establish rules – and possible sanctions in case of 
their violation – on how to provide the public good of carbon dioxide emission reduction 
or global security. Regarding small group interactions, work teams in companies or sports 
teams typically develop social norms on how to deal with ‘rate busters’ or on how to 
reward team members for contributions to the team success. In the private sphere, people 
sharing a flat decide on whether they want to impose rewards or sanctions for the private 
contributions to public goods like cleaning, shopping, cooking, disposing garbage, and so 
on. Obviously, reward and punishment do not always exist as a monetary fine or a 
monetary gift, but also in the form of social approval or disapproval or in many other 
forms that might be at least as effective. 
Seen from a broader perspective, our approach of endogenous institutional choice is 
linked to the question whether democratic participation rights have an influence on 
individual behavior. Frey (1994), Frey et al. (2004) or Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 
(1996), for instance, have studied the effects of the degree of direct-democratic 
participation rights (as a form of endogenous institutional choice) on the level of 
cooperation among citizens and between citizens and the public sector. Their findings 
indicate that stronger direct-democratic participation rights increase cooperation and 
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reduce, for example, tax evasion (see also Feld and Tyran, 2002). In our experiment we 
can examine how the decision to participate in the vote on the institution is linked to a 
subject’s contribution level in the public goods game and to her punishing and rewarding 
behavior. Hence, we can establish a link between voting and economic decision making. 
We are also able to measure the economic benefit of an endogenous institutional choice by 
comparing contributions under the endogenous choice with contributions under identical, 
but exogenously determined, institutions (a comparison that is hardly possible with field 
data). Our results provide clear evidence that endogenous institutional choice yields 
substantial benefits. In other words, we observe a clear democratic participation rights-
premium to cooperation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief 
overview of the related literature. Section 3 presents the public goods game and the 
different institutions that can be implemented in our setting. Section 4 describes our 
experimental design in detail, and in Section 5 we derive several predictions on 
contribution levels and on voting behavior. Section 6 reports the experimental results, and 
finally Section 7 discusses our findings and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 Related literature 
Our paper builds upon a considerable number of studies on the effects of 
exogenously imposed reward and punishment options in social dilemmas. Fehr and 
Gächter (2000, 2002) have analyzed the contributions to a public good when subjects can 
punish each other after having observed the other group members’ contributions. Even 
though using the punishment option is at odds with selfish money-maximization in their 
experimental design, it is used rather frequently, thereby inducing very high levels of 
cooperation.1 
                                                 
1 In political science or social psychology, related results have been documented earlier by Yamagishi (1986) 
or Ostrom et al. (1992), for example. Recently, the emerging field of neuro-economics has examined the 
physiological foundations of punishment. De Quervain et al. (2004) have shown that using the 
punishment option actually triggers some kind of reward for the punishing subject, as it stimulates the 
very area in the brain that is also activated when one is being rewarded. This finding is one rationalization 
of the fact that punishment is even used in one-shot interactions (respectively in the last round of repeated 
 4
A very important feature when analyzing the impact of punishment is the demand for 
punishment under varying prices and/or effectiveness. While some papers use only one 
punishment technology, several other papers, including ours, compare the behavioral 
impact of differently effective punishment (and reward) mechanisms. Only a few papers 
concentrate on eliciting a complete demand function for punishment by a systematic 
variation of the prices of punishment. Anderson and Putterman (2006) as well as Carpenter 
(2007) show that the law of demand holds: the quantity of punishment demanded is lower 
with a higher price. 
Kroll et al. (2007) study the role of punishment in yet another context where group 
members can vote on non-binding minimum contributions to a public good. When failure 
to comply with the non-binding minimum can be punished, contributions increase 
significantly. Thus, it is not the outcome of the non-binding vote that is important for 
higher contributions in such a setting, but the possibility of punishing defectors.2 
One of the few papers that take reward into account is Sefton et al. (2007). They 
have included a reward option in their public goods experiments. Like punishment, reward 
has been found to increase cooperation in comparison to the standard VCM-setting. 
Reward, however, seems to be less suitable for sustaining high levels of cooperation, as the 
decay of contributions over time is faster with the reward option than with the punishment 
option. Hence, using the carrot (i.e., reward) seems to be less efficient for enhancing 
cooperation in a group than the stick (i.e., punishment). A similar result is obtained by Fehr 
and Gächter (2003). They find punishment to be more effective than reward in mitigating 
the free-rider problem and also observe a strong impact of the effectiveness of reward and 
punishment. Andreoni et al. (2003) provide complementary results in a bargaining game 
where a proposer can offer a portion of a pie to a responder, and the responder can reward 
and/or sanction the proposer for her offer. It turns out that the distribution of offers is much 
                                                                                                                                                    
interactions) or when only third parties that are materially unaffected by the actions of the players can 
punish (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). 
2 Masclet et al. (2003) have addressed the question whether the monetary consequences of punishment 
strengthen cooperation or whether the expression of disapproval of another subject’s behavior through 
punishment is possibly equally or even more important. They have compared a public goods game with 
monetary sanctions to one with only symbolic, non-monetary sanctions. Cooperation remains higher with 
the monetary sanctions, but even the non-monetary sanctions raise cooperation levels above those in the 
standard VCM. Rege and Telle (2004) also report a positive effect of (non-monetary) social (dis)approval 
on cooperation in a public goods game. 
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more affected by the punishment option than by the reward option, even though the latter 
also has an effect.3 
Decker et al. (2003) have been the first to let subjects choose endogenously between 
different voting rules for executing the punishment of group members. They let group 
members propose their desired punishment intensity for each group member, and then they 
let subjects submit bids in a first-price auction whether the execution of punishment shall 
require a simple majority or unanimity. It turns out that a unanimity rule is preferred (and 
receives higher bids). A related paper by Ertan et al. (2005) shows that most groups rule 
out the possibility of punishing high contributors, but they implement an institution where 
the punishment of low contributors is possible. Contrary to our paper – and two others 
discussed below – neither Decker et al. (2003) nor Ertan et al. (2005) allow groups to 
choose whether they want to have a punishment option at all. In addition to that, both 
papers do not compare their endogenous treatments with behavior under identical, but 
exogenously imposed institutions. Consequently, they did not assess the effects of 
endogenous institutional choice on cooperation, nor have they considered a reward option. 
There are two recent papers that are more directly related to the research questions in 
this paper. The first one by Botelho et al. (2005) extends the design of Fehr and Gächter 
(2000, 2002) by allowing subjects to choose directly whether they want to operate under a 
punishment institution or under a standard VCM. After subjects have experienced both the 
VCM and the VCM with the punishment option in a (partly perfect) stranger design, they 
can choose the governing institution for one final round (with substantially increased 
salience). Botelho et al. (2005) find that almost none of their cohorts opt for the 
punishment institution. From an ex-post point of view, this choice is justified because the 
overall efficiency of interactions (including punishment costs) is significantly lower in a 
world with punishment than without. Compared to Botelho et al. (2005), our experiment 
considers not only a punishment, but also a reward institution, which will be shown to be 
rather attractive among groups when it is compared to the punishment institution. 
Furthermore, we use a partner design because we are mainly interested in the institutional 
choice of groups whose members will interact repeatedly after the initial decision on the 
                                                 
3 Reward in another interactive context – in the form of (voluntary) bonus contracts in a principal-agent 
relationship – is studied, e.g., by Fehr et al. (2007) or Fehr and Schmidt (2004). Abbink et al. (2000) use 
the moonlighting game to analyze punishment and reward, and Croson and Konow (2008) a variant of the 
dictator game with reward and punishment. 
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governing institution. Finally, in contrast to Botelho et al. (2005) our subjects may abstain 
from participating in the vote. We are, therefore, able to draw inferences on the 
relationship between vote participation and behavior in the public goods game. 
Gürerk et al. (2006) study the self-selection of individuals into groups with an 
exogenously given institution. They find that subjects self-select into groups where they 
can both punish and reward other group members much more often than into groups with a 
standard VCM procedure only. Our approach is different in several aspects: First, we let 
groups self-select the institution that shall apply to their interaction. Therefore, our 
approach resembles a choice of rules within a fixed group in contrast to the voting by feet-
approach of Gürerk et al. (2006). Second, we compare the attractiveness of reward and 
punishment when they are equally effective and when subjects can choose directly 
between both institutions. In Gürerk et al. (2006) punishment had much stronger 
consequences than reward. Third, in Gürerk et al. (2006) subjects could switch between 
different institutions as often as they wished to without any costs. In our design, we 
implement small costs of voting in order to be able to assess potential effects of vote 
participation on cooperation, and sanctioning and rewarding behavior. Group members are 
not required to participate in this vote, but those abstaining are bound by the collective 
decision of voters in their group. 
 
 
3 Our public goods setup 
Let I = {1, 2, …, n} denote a group of n subjects who interact in T periods. In each 
period { }Tt  ..., ,2 ,1∈  individual Ii∈  receives an endowment E which can be allocated 
either to a private good or a public good. The voluntary contribution of individual i to the 
public good in period t must satisfy Ec ti ≤≤ ,0 . Let Ct denote the sum of all group 
members’ contributions (i.e. ∑ == nj tjt cC 1 , ). Individual member i’s payoff from her 
contribution in period t is given by 
 ttiti CcE γπ +−= ,,  (1) 
The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from investing into the public good is 
denoted as γ, which satisfies γγ n<<< 10 , meaning that the self-interested choice and 
the socially optimal one are in conflict. 
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We consider three variants of this basic game: (i) the standard voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM) as it has just been described, (ii) the VCM with a punishment option, 
and (iii) the VCM with a reward option. In the standard VCM, all decisions are made 
simultaneously and each period has only one stage (the contribution stage). In the VCM 
with punishment (reward) each period has two stages, first the contribution stage and, 
thereafter, a punishment (reward) stage. In the second stage, group members receive 
information about the other members’ contributions and can punish (reward) each of the 
other group members. Punishment is costly for the punisher and the punished subject. 
Reward is costly for the rewarding subject and beneficial for the rewarded subject. 
We implement reward or punishment as a binary decision. Hence, a group member 
cannot choose between different intensities of reward or punishment4. The effectiveness of 
reward or punishment, however, is exogenously varied. We use the term “leverage” and 
the symbol L to refer to different technologies. We consider |L| = l or |L| = h, with lh > . A 
higher leverage means that the same choice of punishing or rewarding another subject has 
larger monetary consequences for the punished or rewarded subject (keeping constant the 
costs for the subject who punishes or rewards). 
Taking into account the monetary consequences of the second stage in each period 
yields the following payoff function for member i in the VCM with punishment, or reward. 
 ∑∑
≠≠
−++−=
ih
thi
ik
tikttiti ppLCcE ,,,, γπ  (2) 
where 1, =thkp  if member k has punished (rewarded) member h in period t and zero 
otherwise.5 The sign of the parameter L indicates whether punishment (L < 0) or reward (L 
> 0) applies. The absolute value of L captures the effectiveness of the punishment (reward) 
                                                 
4 The reason to choose such a simple form of reward and punishment is that we wanted to make sure that 
subjects fully understand the available institutions in the endogenous treatments. Any more complicated 
reward or punishment technology would have made the choice task of the participants more difficult and 
would not have added important further insights. Our simple, binary punishment or reward technology 
has the additional advantage that it is very weak – contrary to all other studies where the intensity of 
reward or punishment could be varied substantially. If we find effects of punishment and reward with our 
weak, binary, technology, then it seems reasonable that a stronger technology with a broader range of 
intensities would also have positive effects on contribution levels. 
5 Normalizing the cost of punishment (reward) is always possible by an appropriate choice of L. Note that if 
the last two terms in equation (2) are dropped (or the punishment and reward option are not used), we are 
back in the standard VCM given by equation (1). 
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technology, with a larger |L| indicating a stronger effect (a higher leverage) of one’s own 
actions on the profits of others.6 
 
 
4 Experimental design and procedure 
Our experimental treatments were based on the public goods games introduced in the 
previous section. The parameters were set up as follows: group size n = 4, endowment per 
period E = 20 ECU (experimental currency unit), MPCR γ = 0.4, and number of periods T 
= 10. We used a design that systematically varies the following three factors: 
F1. The institution governing the provision of the public good: either (i) the 
standard VCM, (ii) the VCM with punishment, or (iii) the VCM with reward. 
F2. The leverage of punishment or reward: either (i) |L| = 1 or (ii) |L| = 3.7 
F3. The way in which the institution is determined: either (i) exogenously by the 
experimenter or (ii) endogenously by the group itself through a voting 
procedure. 
Table 1 summarizes our experimental treatments and the number of independent 
observations (i.e. groups) in each treatment. We used a partner matching, which yields one 
statistically independent observation per group of four subjects. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
                                                 
6 Needless to say, it is impossible to design a straightforward mechanism where punishment and reward are 
equivalent in terms of efficiency, unless the Nash equilibrium (assuming selfishness and common 
knowledge of rationality) is played. By nature, costly punishment makes everybody worse off if used, 
whereas costly reward has the potential of increasing overall efficiency (if |L| > 1). Since all real-world 
sanction and reward mechanisms have this feature, it seems natural to preserve it when studying the 
choice between reward and punishment in the laboratory. 
7 Though one can find a wide range of technologies for the punishment option (ranging from a 1:1 ratio in 
Sefton et al., 2007, to a 1:5 ratio in Andreoni et al., 2003), the comparative statics of different 
technologies on contribution levels have only recently been examined systematically. See Anderson and 
Putterman (2006), Casari and Luini (2005), Egas and Riedl (2008), Masclet and Villeval (2008), 
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) or the survey in Casari (2005). The only paper that we are aware of 
which is attempting to analyze different reward technologies in a very similar setting to ours is Fehr and 
Gächter (2003). 
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The first two factors of our design have been explained in the previous section. The 
way in which the institution is determined (factor F3) requires some additional 
explanation. In the exogenous treatments, the institutions were simply pre-determined by 
the experimenter. Participants in these sessions were informed in the experimental 
instructions about the institution under which they were playing the public goods game. 
In the endogenous treatments, participants were introduced to all three possible 
institutions and could determine the institution prevailing in their group by the following 
procedure: First, subjects had to decide whether they wanted to participate in a costly vote 
on the institution. Voters incurred a small one-time fee of 10 ECU (equal to 5% of the sum 
of the individual endowment over the ten periods). Non-voters did not incur any costs, but 
were aware that the decision of voters would be binding for them. The voting cost allows 
us to get rid of theoretical cases of indifference regarding voter turnout and to analyze 
connections between voter turnout and behavior in the public good game. Then, the 
following approval voting protocol with simultaneous choices of all voters was applied: 
Each voter had to indicate for each available institution (standard-VCM, punishment, or 
reward) whether she was willing to accept this institution or not. It is important to note 
here that the endogenous choice was always restricted to a given leverage |L|. Hence, in 
one endogenous experimental treatment subjects could choose between the standard VCM, 
punishment with |L| = 1, or reward with |L| = 1. In the other endogenous experimental 
treatment, the leverage was always |L| = 3. 
The voting outcome was determined as follows: If unanimous consent for any of the 
three institutions was not reached in the first ballot, the vote was repeated until unanimity 
(for at least one institution) was achieved.8 In the case of a unanimous consent of all voters 
for exactly one institution, this institution was applied in the public goods game for all ten 
periods. If more than one institution had received unanimous support, then the institution 
was determined by a random draw from the tied institutions.9 Finally, if none of the four 
                                                 
8 There was no upper limit on the number of voting rounds. In the results section we will show that most 
groups reached a consensus rather soon. Even the groups with the highest number of voting rounds before 
reaching an agreement finished the voting procedure in less than ten minutes (because the software 
yielded instantaneous feedback after the last voter in a group had confirmed her voting decisions). 
Remember that the costs of participating in the vote were one-time and, thus, independent of the number 
of voting rounds. 
9 We do not argue that our voting mechanism is actually applied to real-world institutions for social 
dilemmas. We are confident, however, that its structure comes close to more or less tacit agreements on 
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group members had participated in the vote, then the institution was determined randomly 
in order to avoid creating a bias by imposing a default institution. 
Voters were always informed about the total number of voters in their group, and 
after each voting round they were also informed about the number of votes each institution 
had received. Voting decisions were secret in the sense that they could not be linked to 
individuals or individual behavior in the consecutive public goods game. 
One noteworthy feature of our design is that there was not a history of the VCM 
before participants decided on whether to vote and what to vote for. While one might claim 
that this is a disadvantage of our design – because subjects had to make an institutional 
choice before having experienced a particular institution – we believe it is rather a strength, 
given that we are mainly interested in the kind of rules that subjects prefer when facing a 
social dilemma situation. As such, our focus is on the initial choice of rules, and not on 
how the choice of rules depends on previous experience with different rules.10 
In the punishment or reward stage that followed the contribution stage, subjects were 
informed about the contributions of all group members, and could decide on which 
members to punish or reward (depending on the prevailing institution). It was possible to 
punish or reward any other member and also more than one group member. At the end of 
each period subjects were again informed about the other members’ contributions, and 
about the decisions on punishment and reward (if applicable) and the resulting payoffs. 
Each member of a group had a unique ID. Contributions to the public good could be 
assigned to this ID throughout the experiment. Decisions on reward and punishment, 
however, could not be linked to the ID. Hence, subjects could not identify which other 
group member had punished or rewarded them. This was done in order to avoid retaliation 
                                                                                                                                                   
the implementation of sanctions and rewards in many small groups in real life and also to the decision 
making in institutional arrangements in larger international organizations, like in the context of the Kyoto 
protocol or World Trade Organization negotiation rounds (where unanimity is often required to 
implement an institution). 
10 In order to check whether more experience with the game could lead to different results regarding the 
endogenous choice, we asked subjects in a post-experimental questionnaire whether they would stick to 
their institutional decision if the experiment had continued or whether they would now support another 
institution. The results from this questionnaire reinforce our conclusions based on initial choices and are 
presented in detail in Section 6.2.1. 
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(of one member punishing another for having been punished by the other member in the 
past).11 
In the exogenous treatments we had in total 200 participants, yielding ten 
independent observations for each of the five different exogenous treatments (i.e. VCM, 
punishment with L = –1 or L = –3, and reward with L = 1 or L = 3). In the endogenous 
treatment we let 160 participants choose their desired institution when the leverage of 
reward or punishment was fixed at |L| = 1. Hence, we have 40 independent observations 
for the institutional choice with the low leverage. In addition, we had another 80 
participants (i.e. 20 independent groups) choosing the institution under the high leverage 
|L| = 3. 
In sum, 440 students drawn from the general undergraduate population at the 
University of Innsbruck participated in the computerized experiment (using z-Tree by 
Fischbacher, 2007). No subject was allowed to participate in more than one session and 
none of them had participated in a public goods experiment before.12 Decisions were taken 
anonymously in cubicles and communication among participants was not permitted. The 
average session length was less than one hour, and subjects earned about 10 € on average. 
 
 
5 Theoretical predictions 
This section presents theoretical predictions for three different models of subjects’ 
preferences. The first model is the standard homo oeconomicus-model, which assumes that 
decision makers are rational and purely selfish. The two other models belong to the group 
of outcome-based social preference models (at least in the way in which they are 
implemented below). Although there are many other models of social preferences (among 
them also intention-based models), the two models considered here are among the most 
prominent ones, they share some desirable properties for games where punishment or 
reward are involved, and they are tractable for deriving clear predictions, in particular for 
the case of our vote on institutions. It is important to note that our experiment is by no 
                                                 
11 Such “counter-punishment” is documented and analyzed in Denant-Boemont et al. (2005) and Nikiforakis 
(2008), for instance. 
12 The experimental instructions for endogenous choice under |L| = 3 can be found in Appendix A. The 
instructions for the other treatments are analogous and available upon request. All instructions were 
context-free and neutrally framed. 
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means designed to deliver a rigorous test of the empirical validity of the models. Their 
application to our setting simply allows us to organize our theoretical predictions in a 
systematic way. 
First, the model of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assumes that 
subjects compare their own material payoff with the material payoff of each other member 
in their reference group.13 In particular, the utility of subject i in a set of n subjects depends 
on the vector of monetary payoffs π = (π1, …, πn) in the following form: 
{ } { }∑ ∑
≠ ≠
−−−−−−= ij ij jiiijiii nnU 0,max1
10,max
1
1)( ππβππαππ  (3) 
with βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (3) 
captures the utility losses from disadvantageous inequality towards other group members 
(with weight αi), and the third term the losses from advantageous inequality (with weight 
βi). A desire to reduce inequality among group members may be one of the motivations for 
using instruments like punishment or reward. Therefore, we consider the model of Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) as a straightforward choice to derive predictions for our setting.14 Note 
that the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) nests the homo oeconomicus-model of pure 
self-interest when it is assumed that αi = βi = 0. 
The model by Charness and Rabin (2002) assumes that subjects care about social 
welfare. Their interpretation of social welfare includes the minimum payoff in the group 
and the sum of all group members’ payoffs. More specifically, in their general model 
Charness and Rabin (2002, see their Appendix 1) define a subject’s preferences in a set of 
n subjects with π = (π1, …, πn) as the vector of monetary payoffs in the following form: 
[ ])...)(1(),...,min()1()( 211 nniiU πππδππδλπλπ +++−++−=  (4) 
The weight a subject assigns to social welfare relative to the own payoff is measured 
by ]1,0[∈λ . Note that setting 0=λ  captures the case of pure self-interest as in the homo 
oeconomicus-model. The weight ]1,0[∈δ  is attached to the “maximin”-aspect of social 
                                                 
13 A model of social preferences where subjects compare their own payoff to the average payoff in their 
group (as in another influential model by Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, for instance) seems less 
straightforward to be used in our context. This has been shown by Falk et al. (2005) in a similar setting. 
14 In fact, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have applied their model to a public goods game with punishment. They 
have not used it for rewards, though, nor for a setting with endogenous choice between reward and 
punishment. 
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welfare, and the weight 1–δ applies to total-surplus maximization. Since social welfare 
aspects seem particularly relevant for the reward institution with L = 3 we regard the model 
by Charness and Rabin (2002) as a valuable complement to the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-
model for deriving theoretical predictions. Note that we do not consider the version of the 
Charness and Rabin (2002)-model that takes intentions into account, because it does not 
seem suitable to derive clear theoretical predictions from it for the institutional vote in our 
setup. 
The main predictions from the three models are summarized in Table 2. They rely on 
the assumptions of common knowledge of rationality and risk neutrality. The finitely 
repeated game is solved through backward-induction. For the sake of succinctness, we 
discuss in this section only the main intuition for the theoretical results of Table 2. The 
interested reader is referred to Appendix B for formal derivations and proofs. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
5.1 Standard preferences 
Applying standard preferences yields straightforward predictions (see the first 
column in Table 2). A rational money-maximizing agent will abstain from costly 
punishment or reward. Hence, contributions do not depend on the availability of 
punishment or reward, irrespective of their leverage. Since free-riding is a dominant 
strategy due to γ < 1, all treatments will lead to zero contributions. As a consequence, 
subjects should be indifferent between the available institutions in the endogenous 
treatments and, thus, abstain from voting in order to save the voting costs. 
 
5.2 Inequity aversion – Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-preferences 
Incorporating inequity aversion in the utility function leads to equilibria with positive 
contributions in the standard VCM, as Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 839 and pp. 860-863) 
have shown. The main intuition behind their result is that if a subject’s aversion against 
advantageous inequity is strong enough, she may refrain from free-riding. In formal terms, 
γ + βi ≥ 1 is a precondition for positive contributions in equilibrium. However, as long as a 
group of four members (as is the case in our experiment) has at least one single free-rider 
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with γ + βi < 1, positive contributions cannot be sustained in equilibrium (see [A] in the 
second column of Table 2). Only if all group members satisfy γ + βi ≥ 1, any positive 
contribution from the interval [0, 20] constitutes an equilibrium (see [B] in the second 
column of Table 2).15 
The same equilibria [A] and [B] also prevail with punishment or reward under the 
low leverage |L| = 1, and even with reward under L = 3. The low-leverage punishment does 
not constitute a credible threat to induce free-riders (who satisfy γ + βi < 1) to contribute 
positive amounts. Similarly, the incentive to receive rewards is not sufficient to make free-
riders contribute under both possible levels of leverage in our experiment. Hence, if there 
is at least one free-rider in the group, cooperative equilibria do not exist in our setup for 
these three conditions. 
Only with a high-leverage punishment option it is possible for cooperators (who 
satisfy γ + βi ≥ 1) to enforce positive contributions also from free-riders. Let n’ denote the 
number of cooperators in a group, then 0)1/(' >−= γLnc . This result is driven by the fact 
that free-riders are, then, better off contributing and thus avoiding punishment instead of 
free-riding and getting punished. Punishment is a credible threat, because cooperators are 
able to reduce the disadvantageous inequality caused by actual free-riding through the 
efficient punishment option. Since cooperators suffer from inequality they would be 
willing to bear the cost of punishment to reduce it. In equilibrium, group members 
contribute and punishment is never used. 
Concerning the incentives to participate in the vote on the institution in the 
endogenous treatments, it is important to note that the predictions on contributions are the 
same for the standard VCM and punishment or reward with the low leverage |L| = 1. 
Hence, subjects have no incentive to vote under |L| = 1, as the institution does not make a 
difference (see panel (B) in Table 2). 
With the high-leverage and a punishment option, it is possible to induce the free-
riders to contribute a positive amount up to c  (the latter threshold depending on the 
                                                 
15 This latter case is empirically rather unlikely, though. If we take, for the purposes of illustration, the 
assumptions about the distribution of social preference parameters as reported in Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 
p. 844), there will be 60% of subjects with βi < 0.6. The latter implies that only in about 2.6% of all cases 
all group members will satisfy βi ≥ 0.6 (if n = 4) and that in the remaining 97.4% of cases the only 
equilibrium will be zero contributions (because at least one member satisfies βi < 0.6). 
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number of cooperators in the group). Hence, cooperators should vote for punishment to be 
able to enforce positive contributions from free-riders. 
 
5.3 Social welfare – Charness and Rabin (2002)-preferences 
If subjects care for social welfare, they may contribute positive amounts in the 
standard VCM. The Charness and Rabin (2002)-model would predict that subjects who 
weigh social welfare at least as strongly as their own payoffs (implying 5.0≥iλ ) will 
contribute their full endowment (see the right-most column in Table 2). For all subjects 
with 5.0<iλ , complete free-riding is a dominant strategy. Hence, there are asymmetric 
equilibria in the standard VCM when subjects have Charness and Rabin (2002)-
preferences.16 
Adding a punishment option does not change any of these predictions. The intuition 
for the irrelevance of the punishment option is straightforward: Relatively selfish group 
members (those with 5.0<iλ ) would contribute positive amounts if the threat of getting 
punished for zero contributions was credible. However, a punishing group member will 
reduce her own payoff and the group’s total payoff. Furthermore, punishment will never 
increase the minimum payoff in the group but rather decrease it in many cases. Taken 
together, a subject suffers a utility loss from punishment in any case (disregarding possible 
intentional reasons to punish), and will thus not execute it. Consequently, punishment 
cannot induce any contributions in excess to those under the VCM. 
However, the reward option is a useful tool to induce positive contributions with 
Charness and Rabin (2002)-preferences. This is straightforward for the case of L = 3, 
where subjects who care much for social welfare (who satisfy 5.0≥iλ  and thus contribute 
ci = 20; their number is denoted by n’’) can enforce a positive contribution of 
)1/('' γ−= Lnc  even from subjects who care less for social welfare (with 5.0<iλ ). This 
enforcement rests on rewarding the latter subjects for contributing c . For the case of L = 
1, the same argument applies, but reward can only be part of an equilibrium strategy (and 
thus c  can only be enforced) if there are n’’ subjects who care quite a lot for social welfare 
and largely disregard their own payoff (by satisfying 75.0≥iλ ). 
                                                 
16 Note that if all group members satisfy λi < 0.5, all group members (symmetrically) free-ride. 
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These predictions for contributions imply that subjects who care a lot for social 
welfare should participate in the vote in our endogenous treatments and support the reward 
option in order to be able to enforce positive contributions from subjects who care little for 
social welfare (and who do not participate in the vote). Note that the latter group of 
subjects does only contribute in the VCM with reward, but not in the standard VCM or the 
VCM with punishment.17 
 
 
6 Experimental results 
6.1 Behavior with exogenously determined institutions 
Figure 1 displays the time trend of contributions over the ten periods in the different 
treatments with exogenous institutions, and panel (A) of Table 3 reports the overall 
averages. Contributions are lowest in the standard VCM-treatment, where subjects 
contribute on average 32.5% of their endowment (= 6.50 out of 20 ECU). This is clearly 
above the zero contribution level expected under the standard approach of common 
knowledge of rationality and selfishness, but it is not ruled out when taking into account 
social preferences. With the low leverage |L| = 1, the average contributions are only 
slightly higher with punishment (8.79) or with reward (6.62) than in the standard VCM. 
None of the non-parametric pairwise comparisons of contributions yields a significant 
difference, though. This is in accordance with the predictions based on Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999)-preferences, and it is not ruled out using the Charness and Rabin (2002)-model 
either, as long as no group member puts a very strong weight on social welfare by 
satisfying 75.0≥iλ . From panel (B) of Table 3 it is also easy to see that profits are not 
significantly different between the standard VCM and the VCM with punishment or 
reward under |L| = 1. 
 
Result 1. When the institution is fixed exogenously and when |L| = 1, the institution does 
not influence the level of contributions. Hence, reward and punishment options do not lead 
to higher contributions than the standard VCM when their effectiveness is low. 
 
Figure 1 and Table 3 about here 
                                                 
17 This conclusion relies on the assumption that the voting costs are small. See Appendix B for more details. 
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When we look at contribution levels under the high leverage |L| = 3, we find 
significantly higher contributions with punishment (12.11) or reward (11.20) than in the 
standard VCM (6.50) (p < 0.05 for both pairwise comparisons; two-sided Mann-Whitney 
U-test18; N = 20 in each case). We find no significant difference in contribution levels 
between the punishment and reward treatments, though. 
When we examine the impact of the leverage for a given institution, i.e., the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms, we find significantly higher contributions under the high 
leverage (|L| = 3) than under the low leverage (|L| = 1) both for punishment (12.11 vs. 
8.79; p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 20) and for reward (11.20 vs. 6.62; p < 0.05; 
Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 20). This has been expected for punishment with Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999)-preferences and for reward with Charness and Rabin (2002)-preferences. 
 
Result 2. When the institution is fixed exogenously and when punishment or reward are 
highly effective (|L| = 3), both institutions trigger significantly higher contribution levels 
than the standard linear VCM or the punishment and reward institutions under |L| = 1. 
 
Checking profits and thus the important issue of the efficiency of different 
institutions under |L| = 3, panel (B) of Table 3 reveals that average profits are significantly 
higher under reward (29.37) than under both punishment (24.83) and the standard VCM 
(23.90). The underlying reason for this is that reward with high effectiveness is efficiency 
enhancing, whereas actual punishment has rather high social costs (of 4 ECU per instance 
of punishment). The latter fact explains why profits with punishment under |L| = 3 are not 
higher than in the standard VCM even though average contributions are almost twice as 
high. 
Turning to the frequency of using the punishment and reward options in the 
exogenous treatments, we can provide evidence that both are used more often in the high 
leverage condition |L| = 3 than in the low leverage condition, but only significantly so with 
reward. Rewards are assigned in 44% of all possible cases under |L| = 3 and only in 10% 
of cases under |L| = 1 (p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 20). This is a clear indication 
that subjects exploit the potential efficiency gains under |L| = 3 to a large extent. The 
                                                 
18 All non-parametric tests reported in this paper are two-sided, and the overall average contribution in each 
group is always treated as a single, statistically independent observation. 
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leverage has, however, no significant effect on the frequency of punishment, which is used 
in 20% of all cases under |L| = 3 and in 15% under |L| = 1. 
 
Result 3. Regarding the actual frequency of using punishment or reward, subjects are 
much more responsive to a higher leverage in the reward institution than in the 
punishment institution. Under |L| = 3 rewarding is significantly more frequent than under 
|L| = 1. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
 
Figures 2 and 3 provide a more detailed picture of the patterns of reward and 
punishment, depending upon the leverage. They show the relative frequency with which a 
subject j is rewarded or punished by subject i, contingent on the absolute difference 
between subject i’s and subject j’s contribution. Concerning the frequency of punishment, 
we can discern from the left-most bar in Figure 2, for instance, that in 46% of the cases in 
which member j contributes 14 to 20 tokens less than member i punishment of member j 
by member i is observed. In general, there is a decrease in the relative frequency of 
punishment when moving from left to right in Figure 2. This means that members j are 
more frequently punished the less they contribute in comparison to member i. Like Fehr 
and Gächter (2000), we also observe a positive, but relatively small number of low 
contributors that punish high contributors.19 
The picture is different for rewards (in Figure 3), where one is generally more likely 
to be rewarded the higher one’s contribution in comparison to the contribution of the 
rewarding member. Under the high leverage, though, it seems that the subjects with high 
contributions reward each other, which leads to a peak in the central deviation range of [-2, 
2] between member j’s and member i’s contributions. Finally, note that under the high 
leverage the probability of getting rewarded is generally very high if one contributes at 
least as much as the potentially rewarding subjects. 
 
                                                 
19 Herrmann et al. (2008) use the term antisocial punishment for such cases, and they demonstrate that 
antisocial punishment is widespread around the world, though it is contained by strong norms of civic 
cooperation and positive attitudes towards the rule of law. 
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Result 4. The likelihood of getting punished is inversely related to a subject’s contribution. 
Reward is most often granted for subjects that contribute at least as much as or more than 
the rewarding subject. 
 
 
6.2 Behavior with endogenously determined institutions 
6.2.1 Participation in the vote and institutional choice 
Seventy one out of 160 subjects (44%) participate in the voting procedure in the low-
leverage condition. In the high-leverage condition, 48 out of 80 subjects (60%) take part in 
the costly vote. In fact, voter turnout is significantly higher in the high-leverage condition 
(χ2 = 5.21, p < 0.05), as qualitatively expected if subjects have social preferences of either 
the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)- or the Charness and Rabin (2002)-type. Obviously, the 
standard prediction of abstention from the vote fails. 
 
Result 5. Voter turnout is significantly higher when reward and punishment are more 
effective (|L| = 3) than when they are less effective (|L| = 1). 
 
In panels (A) and (B) of Table 4 we report the number of voting rounds until a 
unanimous agreement was reached, contingent upon the number of group members that 
participated in the voting procedure. Of course, all groups with only one voter finish the 
procedure after the first round because the single voter can implement his or her most 
desired institution. Across both leverage levels, 46 out of 57 groups reach an agreement 
within the first four voting rounds. In the low-leverage condition, the maximum number of 
voting rounds is 26, whereas in the high-leverage condition three groups need more than 
50 voting rounds to reach an agreement, with a maximum of 103 voting rounds in one 
group (which finally settled – in less than 10 minutes – for the standard VCM). 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Panel (C) of Table 4 reports the preferences of voters. More precisely, it shows the 
number of times each possible institution (VCM, punishment or reward) is supported under 
both leverages in the very first voting round. Remember that voters could support more 
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than one institution. The standard VCM is most often supported when |L| = 1, whereas the 
VCM with reward is most preferred when |L| = 3, and the distribution of preferences is 
significantly different between both leverages (χ2 = 13.09, p < 0.01). The rightmost 
column shows the frequency with which a voter’s preference coincided with the actually 
chosen institution. We see that in total 97 out of 119 voters (i.e. 82%) experienced the very 
institution that they had supported in the first round of voting. 
Table 1 reveals the chosen institutions in the two different leverage conditions. With 
the low-leverage (|L| = 1), 25 out of 40 groups choose the standard VCM, five groups opt 
for the VCM with punishment and ten groups agree on the VCM with reward. The 
distribution of chosen institutions is significantly different from a random one and also 
markedly different from the distribution in the high-leverage condition (χ2 = 19.61, p < 
0.01). There were three groups in which none of the four members voted. Coincidentally, 
the random determination of the institution yielded one group each for the standard VCM, 
the punishment institution and the reward institution. 
With the high leverage (|L| = 3), 17 out of 20 groups choose the VCM with reward 
and the remaining three groups the standard VCM. No group opts for the VCM with 
punishment in the high-leverage condition. The distribution of chosen institutions with the 
high leverage is completely at odds with the predictions from the Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999)-model, but fits the predictions from the Charness and Rabin (2002)-model very 
well. Subjects obviously aim for the option to reward each other mutually when the reward 
option increases overall efficiency. Note that the equilibrium in which each group member 
rewards every other group member is actually quite frequent with 21% of all cases (36 out 
of 170). Not surprisingly, there is not a single such case of mutual rewarding under the 
endogenously chosen reward with |L| = 1. 
 
Result 6. The distribution of institutional choices depends significantly on the leverage of 
reward and punishment. Given a high leverage, 85% of groups endogenously choose the 
VCM with reward, whereas with a low leverage the majority of groups (63%) agree on the 
standard VCM. 
 
In order to check the robustness of our results regarding the endogenous institutional 
choice and subjects’ satisfaction with their chosen roles, we asked them at the end of the 
experiment whether they would vote again and, if so, for which institution they would vote 
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if the experiment were to be continued. The data from this questionnaire reveal that 72% of 
voters (86 out of 119) would vote again for exactly the same institution. Only 13% of 
voters would abstain from voting, and 15% would switch to a different institution.20 
The answers of non-voters are markedly different, because 74 out of 121 non-voters 
(61%) indicated that they would participate in the vote if the experiment were repeated. 
Most of them would have voted for punishment under |L| = 1 (27 out of 47) and for reward 
under |L| = 3 (22 out of 27). This clearly indicates that our results on the endogenous 
institutional choice would have been very similar and our conclusions corroborated if it 
had taken place in a later stage after several periods of experience with the VCM. 
 
6.2.2 Contributions in the endogenous treatments 
Figure 4 shows the time trend of contributions over the ten periods in the different 
treatments with endogenous institutional choice, and panel (A) of Table 5 reports the 
overall averages. In the low-leverage condition (|L| = 1), contributions are lowest in the 
standard VCM (5.48), intermediate in the VCM with reward (8.53) and clearly highest in 
the VCM with punishment (16.13). Each pairwise comparison yields significant 
differences (p < 0.05 in each case; Mann-Whitney U-tests). This means that with an 
endogenous institutional choice, the possibility of rewarding and punishing increases the 
level of cooperation significantly in comparison to the standard VCM, even though the 
leverage of reward and punishment is low. Punishment works best here, as it is associated 
with average contributions that are almost twice as high as with reward. 
In the high-leverage condition, no group agreed on the punishment option. Groups 
with the reward institution have significantly higher contribution levels (14.59) than 
groups in the standard VCM (9.17) (p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 20) or groups 
with reward under |L| = 1 (8.53; p < 0.05, N = 27). 
 
                                                 
20 Half of those subjects who would abstain from voting had voted for the standard VCM in the beginning. 
The rest of those indicating to abstain were almost equally split between voters who had in the beginning 
preferred either punishment or reward. Regarding voters who would switch to another institution, there is 
no clear pattern. Seven out of ten subjects who had voted for the standard VCM in the beginning would 
switch to reward, the other three to punishment. Five out of seven subjects who had preferred reward 
initially would vote for punishment, the two other for the standard VCM. Only one subject who had voted 
for punishment would vote for a different institution, namely reward. 
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Result 7. When the institution is determined endogenously, we find for both leverages that 
reward leads to higher contributions than the standard VCM. The same holds true for 
punishment with the low leverage. Since there is not a single group that chooses the 
punishment option under the high leverage, we cannot assess its effect on contributions 
there. 
 
Figure 4 and Table 5 about here 
 
Average profits per group member and period are shown in panel (B) of Table 5. 
They are always significantly lower in the standard VCM than with punishment or reward. 
Under the low leverage, average profits are about 15% higher with punishment than with 
reward (p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney U-test; N = 15). 
Figures 5 and 6 show the relative frequency of punishment and reward, depending on 
the difference in contributions of group members i and j. Since the patterns are very similar 
to the ones observed in Figures 2 and 3, we refer to the discussion of these figures in 
Section 6.1. Overall, the reward option is again more often used under |L| = 3 than under 
|L| = 1 (55% vs. 17%; p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney U-test, N = 27). In the punishment 
treatment under the low leverage, subjects use the punishment option only in 10% of all 
cases. Nevertheless, they can sustain the highest contribution levels. 
 
Figures 5 and 6 about here 
 
6.2.3 How voting relates to contributions and the use of sanctions 
We have already shown that 44% (under |L| =1), respectively 60% (under |L| =3), of 
subjects participated in the vote on the institution. In this subsection, we analyze whether 
the decision to participate in the vote is systematically related to a subject’s contributions 
in the public goods game. One intuitive conjecture would be that subjects who participate 
in the vote are those who care relatively more for the common interest of the group 
because they try to implement an institution that they consider to be the best. In fact, using 
the Charness and Rabin (2002)-model we have been able to show that subjects who care 
relatively much for social welfare are expected to participate in the vote (see Table 2 and 
Appendix B). The same subjects are also expected to contribute more to the public good. 
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Hence, one should expect higher contributions from voters than from non-voters. Table 6 
reports the results of a censored tobit regression where we regressed a member’s 
contribution on her decision to participate in the vote (1 = voter), on the selected institution 
(separate dummies for punishment and reward), on the leverage (1 if |L| = 3), and on the 
number of voters in a group. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Column [1] of Table 6 presents the marginal effects of the independent variables and 
considers only the contributions in the very first period as the dependent variable. It shows 
that the dummy for voters is significantly positive, despite controlling for other 
institutional variables within a group. Voters contribute about 4 ECU (or 20% of their 
endowment) more than non-voters. Hence, participation in the vote is a significant 
indicator of a subject’s initial level of cooperation.21 
Interestingly enough, this voter-effect disappears very quickly, as it is obviously 
overpowered by the evolution of decisions within a group. The dummy for voters already 
ceases to be significant in period 2 (see column [2] of Table 6). The dummy also remains 
insignificant if we take a subject’s overall average contributions over all ten periods as the 
dependent variable (see column [3]). It is comforting to note, though, that the other 
variables of interest (punishment, reward and leverage) always remain significantly 
positive in columns [2] and [3].22 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
In Table 7 we report a panel probit regression of a member’s decision to punish or 
reward on the following variables: member i being a voter, the number of voters in the 
                                                 
21 It is important to note that the documented “voter”-effect does not depend on whether a voter faced her 
preferred institution (i.e. the one that a voter supported in the first voting round) or not. Including a 
dummy for being “overruled” (meaning that a voter finally accepted an institution that she did not support 
in the beginning) does not change the magnitude and significance of the “voter”-dummy. The 
“overruled”-dummy itself is not significant. 
22 A Poission regression model that accounts for the integer values of the dependent variable yields basically 
the same results as those presented in Table 6. 
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group, member i’s contribution to the public good, and the difference between member i’s 
and member j’s contributions in a given period. We find that voters are much more likely 
to reward other group members than non-voters, both under |L| = 1 and |L| = 3. Voters do 
not have a higher probability than non-voters to punish other group members, though. The 
average contribution within a group has a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of 
punishment, and a significantly positive influence on the likelihood of reward. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of member i to punish member j is significantly decreasing 
with the difference between member j’s and member i’s contribution, and the likelihood of 
rewarding is increasing with this difference. 
 
Result 8. Subjects who participate in the vote on the institution contribute significantly 
more to the public good than non-voters in the beginning of the experiment. From period 2 
on, this effect disappears due to interaction within a group. Voters reward others more 
often than non-voters, but they do not punish more often than non-voters. 
 
 
6.3 The effect of an endogenous institutional choice on contributions 
A comparison of the corresponding cells in Table 3 and Table 5 shows immediately 
that average contributions are always higher in the endogenous treatments than in the 
corresponding exogenous treatments in case a reward or punishment option exists. The 
difference is most remarkable and significant for the VCM with punishment under |L| = 1, 
where contributions are on average 16.13 in the endogenous case and 8.79 in the 
exogenous case (p < 0.01; Mann-Whitney U-test; N = 15). In the VCM with reward, the 
differences are weakly significant (6.62 vs. 8.53 under |L| = 1; p = 0.10, N = 20; and 11.20 
vs. 14.59 under |L| = 3; p = 0.09, N = 27), lending support to the conclusion that an 
endogenous institutional choice is a device that increases the level of cooperation in 
comparison to exogenously imposed institutions. This is summarized in our final result. 
 
Result 9. Contributions are higher when reward and punishment are endogenously chosen 
than when these institutions are implemented by an external authority. 
 
Result 9 seems all the more remarkable as it is independent of the number of voters 
in a group. In fact, there is no significant correlation between the average contribution and 
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the number of voters in a group, as the partial correlation coefficient – controlling for 
leverage and institution – is only 0.06 (p > 0.3). There is also no significant relationship 
between the number of voting rounds before implementing an institution and the average 
contribution in a group. Furthermore, the relative frequencies of reward, or punishment, 
are not significantly different between the exogenous and the endogenous treatments, 
given the low leverage |L| = 1. Only for the high leverage we find a higher relative 
frequency of reward in the endogenous treatment than in the exogenous one (55% vs. 44%; 
p < 0.01; Mann-Whitney U-test; N = 27). In sum, we regard the evidence as an indication 
that it is the endogenous choice of the reward or punishment option per se that positively 
affects the contribution levels. 
 
 
7 Discussion and conclusion 
Previous studies have been able to demonstrate that an option to punish defectors and 
reward cooperators in public goods games has a positive influence on the level of 
cooperation. Since the reward or punishment options have typically been implemented 
exogenously by the experimenters, it has remained an open question as to whether subjects 
would actually choose such institutions if given the choice and whether the opportunity to 
choose the desired institution endogenously would have any additional impact on the level 
of cooperation. 
In this paper, we have shown that there is a positive effect of an endogenous choice 
of a reward or punishment mechanism on the level of cooperation within groups. One may 
call this effect a democratic participation rights-premium to cooperation. This premium 
adds to the cooperation-increasing effect of reward or punishment when they are imposed 
exogenously. We consider the demonstration of the existence of this premium the first 
important finding of our paper. Dal Bó et al. (2007) provide evidence that reinforces our 
conclusion regarding the existence of the democratic participation rights-premium. They 
use a prisoner’s dilemma game and show that an endogenous choice of a policy governing 
interaction increases cooperation. 
One possible explanation for the higher levels of cooperation with endogenous 
institutional choice in our experiment might be due to voters intentionally choosing an 
institution. This might be perceived – by non-voters as well as other voters – as a signal 
that these voters actually plan to use the instruments at hand. Consequently, in the case of 
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the VCM with punishment, the collective choice might pose a more credible threat to free-
riders than the exogenous implementation. Furthermore, the threat is already salient in the 
first period to a greater extent, whereas with exogenous institutions it might take a few 
periods to deter free-riding by building up a punishment reputation. Hence, selfish subjects 
might be more reluctant to free-ride in the endogenous treatment. In the case of the VCM 
with reward, the signal from the vote might induce subjects to expect rewards in case they 
contribute relatively high amounts. In fact, the reward option is used significantly more 
often in the endogenous treatment than in the exogenous treatment when the leverage is 
high. In a similar vein, the probability of getting punished when contributing significantly 
less than the potential punisher is much higher in the endogenous treatment than in the 
exogenous treatment (which becomes immediately apparent when comparing Figures 2 
and 5). 
Therefore, from a behavioral perspective the endogenous choice of an institution 
seems to contain more than just the determination of a given set of rules. It can be 
considered as establishing a social norm on how to behave and treat each other. It implies 
the signal of actively supporting – and probably applying – an available instrument. Given 
that the endogenous choice of the standard VCM does not provide group members with 
any instrument to express their (dis)approval with the other members’ contributions, it is 
also not surprising that contributions in the standard VCM do not differ between the 
exogenous and the endogenous case. 
One straightforward implication of our findings concerning the positive effects of an 
endogenous choice is that implementing an endogenous institutional choice may provide a 
welfare-enhancing substitute for increasing the leverage of punishment through an 
exogenous authority. Our results in the exogenous treatments as well as recent studies by 
Anderson and Putterman (2006), Carpenter (2007), Casari and Luini (2005), Egas and 
Riedl (2008), Fehr and Gächter (2003) or Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), for instance, 
have shown that contributions to a public good typically increase when the effectiveness of 
punishment is increased exogenously. However, a high leverage of punishment usually 
implies high social costs because it potentially decreases overall efficiency. In our 
experiment we are able to provide evidence that instead of an increase in the effectiveness 
of punishment one might resort to an endogenous choice of the rules. Note that we find 
contributions in the endogenous treatment with punishment under |L| = 1 to be even 
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significantly higher than contributions in the exogenous punishment treatment with |L| = 3 
(p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney U-test; N = 15). 
Interestingly enough, the higher aggregate cooperation levels in the endogenous 
treatments do not depend on the number of voters in a group (i.e. the voter turnout), but 
rather on the mere opportunity of an endogenous choice. On the individual level, however, 
we have found that the voluntary (but costly) participation in the vote is a good indicator of 
a subject’s level of cooperation at the beginning of the experiment. Voters have been 
estimated to contribute in the first period about 4 ECU (i.e. 20% of their endowment) more 
to the public good than non-voters. This is a noteworthy effect because it implies that the 
decision to participate in a vote can be linked to economic behavior. Voters, however, do 
not contribute significantly more than non-voters from the second period on, which is a 
possible indication that voters are conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et al., 2001; 
Fischbacher and Gächter, 2006; Gächter, 2007) who react to the contributions of non-
voters. Consequently, the behavior of voters and non-voters converges rather quickly after 
both types of subjects have interacted with each other, even though subjects could not link 
other group members’ contributions to their voting decision. The convergence of voters’ 
and non-voters’ contributions implies that the prevailing institutions overpower the vote-
participation effect on the aggregate level. 
Another important finding of our paper is that the choice of institutions seems to 
depend heavily on their effectiveness. When reward and punishment have a high leverage, 
groups choose almost exclusively the reward option. A straightforward explanation for this 
choice behavior might be the intention to exploit the potentially large efficiency gains 
through mutual rewards. Another explanation for groups shying away from the punishment 
institution might be the fear of high efficiency costs if punishment is actually applied under 
|L| = 3. Furthermore, subjects could simply be myopic in the sense of overestimating the 
costs of being punished that usually accrue in the first periods of a public goods game and 
underestimating the potentially positive effects of the threat of punishment in raising 
contribution levels in the long run. 
When the leverage is low, however, a clear majority of groups prefer the standard 
VCM over the reward or the punishment mechanism. The main reason for preferring the 
standard VCM might be the expectation of subjects that reward or punishment with |L| = 1 
may have little or no effect at all, as is actually true when reward and punishment with the 
low leverage are implemented exogenously. If the institution is chosen endogenously, 
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though, reward or punishment increase the contribution levels even with a low leverage. In 
fact, total profits have been significantly higher both with punishment and with reward 
than with the standard VCM (see Panel (B) of Table 5). Hence, from an ex-post 
perspective it would have paid off, on average, to vote for punishment or reward even with 
the low leverage. 
Our results on the relative attractiveness of reward in comparison to punishment 
complement the recent literature on endogenous institutional choice in public goods 
games. Neither Botelho et al. (2005) and Ertan et al. (2005) nor Gürerk et al. (2006) have 
been able to address this issue in full depth because Botelho et al. (2005) and Ertan et al. 
(2005) only considered punishment and Gürerk et al. (2006) did not allow for a choice 
between reward and punishment. Our results on the relative unattractiveness of punishment 
are basically in line with the findings of Botelho et al. (2005), and they seem to be 
compatible with Ertan et al.’s (2005) finding that groups never allow punishment of high 
contributors. Botelho et al. (2005) argue that subjects opted for the standard VCM because 
subjects had experienced it as more efficient than the punishment institution. In our 
experiment, groups favored the reward institution over punishment possibly because of the 
higher efficiency of reward. Both findings should be considered complementary, indicating 
that subjects do not find the implementation of a punishment option attractive if they have 
an alternative. If they do not have any alternative like in the exogenous case, the 
punishment option is frequently used and has a positive effect on contributions (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000, 2002), as long as the effectiveness of punishment is sufficiently high 
(Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). Nevertheless, it is usually associated with ambiguous 
effects on overall efficiency. If subjects consider efficiency as important – as assumed in 
the model of Charness and Rabin (2002) and as documented in simple distribution 
experiments by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) – the relative attractiveness of the reward 
mechanism seems fairly intuitive. 
It is not a contradiction to our results that punishment mechanisms seem to be much 
more widespread in reality than reward mechanisms. While there is a natural limit to the 
leverage of reward (though, we would argue that this limit is clearly above L = 1, at least in 
terms of potential utility created), the leverage of punishment can be almost infinite. 
Nevertheless, we believe that reward in small groups (e.g., in the form of social approval) 
is much more widespread in reality than economists tend to believe and it should probably 
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also be applied more often in formal contexts (see, e.g., the literature on the possibility of 
rewarding honest tax payers; examples are Alm et al., 1992, or Feld et al., 2006). 
We acknowledge, of course, that the implementation of the institutional choice in our 
experiment is slightly artificial, as compared to how informal sanctions are implemented in 
small groups in reality. Often, an implicit agreement rather than a formal vote is sufficient 
to determine whether members of a group tend to resort to individual punishment or 
individual reward (like in sports teams, for instance). Also, in many cases in reality both 
punishment and reward are feasible at the same time. However, as often in experiments, by 
abstracting a little bit when choosing our design, we believe to have gained considerably in 
terms of possible analytical depth, especially when it comes to be able to detect links 
between voting and contribution behavior. Obviously, implementing other experimental 
environments or even conducting field experiments in order to study the effects of 
endogenous institutions in social dilemmas might be interesting avenues of research for the 
future. 
Regarding the theoretical predictions, it is not surprising that a model with purely 
selfish and rational agents is not consistent with our experimental results. The models with 
social preferences fit our data much better. Both the inequity aversion-model of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) and the social welfare-model of Charness and Rabin (2002) have their 
strengths and weaknesses, though, when it comes to predicting behavior in public goods 
games. The Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-model clearly predicts that punishment and reward 
should not matter for contributions when the leverage is low, and this is what we have 
found in the exogenous treatments. The model is also particularly suited to explain the 
effects of the punishment option under the high leverage, because highly efficient 
punishment can easily reduce inequity. The latter effect makes the threat of punishment 
credible and keeps contributions relatively high. However, the model largely fails to 
predict the observed behavior under the reward institution. This is much better captured by 
the model of Charness and Rabin (2002), who allow for efficiency-minded subjects. A 
striking feature of applying Charness and Rabin (2002) to our setup is the fact that it 
predicts that subjects who care more for social preferences will participate in the vote. First 
round data from our experiment have confirmed this prediction, thereby linking voting 
decisions to contributions. The Charness and Rabin (2002)-model in its outcome-based 
version is less suitable for predicting the effects of punishment, because subjects who care 
for social welfare (but not inequity) will never execute the punishment option. Both social 
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preference models in the variants used in our paper are not too successful in explaining the 
effects of endogenous institutional choice. One straightforward explanation for the latter 
limitation is that they ignore intentions and the emotional as well as physiological 
consequences of the act of punishing or rewarding (de Quervain et al., 2004; Casari and 
Luini, 2006; Brandts and Rivas, 2007). In fact, a large fraction of subjects seem to use the 
punishment and reward options either to reciprocate kind or unkind decisions of others or 
to express their (dis)approval with the contributions of others, independently from the 
effects on the final distribution of profits. Such behavior can be called expressive 
punishment or expressive reward, and it cannot be captured directly by outcome-based 
models of social preferences, like those of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and 
Rabin (2002). Applying intention-based models (for example in the spirit of Rabin, 1993; 
Charness and Rabin, 2002, in its most comprehensive version; Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) can possibly fill this gap in the future, 
even though these models can often not provide clear-cut predictions in more complex 
decision environments. 
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9 Tables and figures 
 
 
# The table indicates the actually chosen institutions in the endogenous treatments. In sum, we had 40 groups in the 
endogenous treatments with |L|=1, and 20 groups with |L|=3. 
Table 1: Treatment characteristics and number of independent observations 
 Institution  
Determination of the 
institution Leverage Standard VCM Punishment Reward 
|L|=1 N = 10 N = 10  
Exogenous 
 |L|=3 
N = 10* 
N = 10 N = 10 
|L|=1 N = 25 N = 5 N = 10 
Endogenous# 
|L|=3 N = 3 – N = 17 
* There is no leverage in the standard VCM because there are no sanctions available. 
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Table 2: Predictions for contributions and voting with different preference models 
Panel (A) – Contributions Standard preferences: 
Selfish payoff-
maximization 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-
preferences: Inequity 
aversion* 
Charness and Rabin 
(2002)-preferences: Social 
welfare maximization# 
Standard VCM ci = 0 ∀ i [A]  ci = 0 ∀ i if ∃ j with βj 
< 0.6, or 
[B]  ci = c ∈ [0, 20] if βi ≥ 
0.6 ∀ i † 
ci = 0 ∀ i with λi < 0.5 and 
ci = 20 ∀ j with λj ≥ 0.5 
(and δj ≤ 1 – 1/2λj) 
Punishment with |L| = 1 ci = 0 ∀ i Same as Standard VCM Same as Standard VCM 
Reward with |L| = 1 ci = 0 ∀ i Same as Standard VCM 0 ≤ ci ≤ )1/(" γ−= Lnc , 
with x = 0.75, otherwise (if 
no member satisfies λi ≥ 
0.75) same as Standard 
VCM 
Punishment with |L| = 3 ci = 0 ∀ i 0 ≤ ci ≤ )1/(' γ−= Lnc  Same as Standard VCM 
Reward with |L| = 3 ci = 0 ∀ i Same as Standard VCM 0 ≤ ci ≤ )1/(" γ−= Lnc , 
with x = 0.5, otherwise (if 
no member satisfies λi ≥ 
0.5) it holds ci = 0 ∀ i. 
    
Panel (B) – Incentives for voting    
Endogenous choice with |L| = 1 No vote participation No vote participation Group members with λi ≥ 
0.75 have an incentive to 
participate in the vote and 
support reward ‡ 
Endogenous choice with |L| = 3 No vote participation Group members with βi ≥ 
0.6 have an incentive to 
participate in the vote and 
support punishment ‡ 
Group members with λi ≥ 
0.5 have an incentive to 
participate in the vote and 
support reward ‡ 
i Group member i, with four members in the group. 
*  The variable n’ indicates the number of group members with βi ≥ 0.6. In the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-model, the 
parameter β measures a subject’s sensitivity to advantageous inequality. 
# The variable n” indicates the number of group members with λi ≥ x (where x constitutes a certain threshold). The 
parameter λ measures in the Charness and Rabin (2002)-model the weight a subject assigns to social welfare relative 
to own payoff (which receives weight 1 – λ). “Social welfare” captures either a concern for the minimum payoff in 
the group (with weight δ) or a concern for the sum of all group members’ payoffs (with weight 1 – δ). 
† Taking for the purpose of illustration the distribution of parameter β reported in Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 844), the 
case of βI ≥ 0.6 ∀ i occurs in 2.6% of cases, whereas the case of at least one group member j satisfying βj < 0.6 
occurs in 97.4% of four-person groups. 
‡ Note that a coordination problem arises in the voting stage, since in equilibrium only one of the group members with 
an incentive to vote should actually vote because voting is costly. 
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# Significant difference (p < 0.05) between standard VCM and punishment. 
* Significant difference (p < 0.05) between standard VCM and reward. 
§ Significant difference (p < 0.05) between punishment and reward. 
 
 
Table 3: Average contributions and profits in the exogenous treatments 
 Leverage Standard VCM Punishment Reward 
|L|=1 
8.79 
(N = 10) 
6.62 
(N = 10) Panel (A) – 
Contributions 
|L|=3 
6.50#,* 
(N = 10) 12.11# 
(N = 10) 
11.20* 
(N = 10) 
|L|=1 24.37 23.97 
Panel (B) – Profits 
|L|=3 
23.90* 
24.83§ 29.37*,§ 
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Table 4: Number of voting rounds and voting behavior in first round 
Panel (A) – Voting rounds with |L|=1 
Reaching an unanimous vote in voting round … Number of voters in a 
group (N = total number 
of groups) 1 2 4 7 9 10 11 13 26 
1 (N = 15) 15         
2 (N = 13) 9 1  1  1  1  
3 (N =  6) 3 1     1  1 
4 (N =  3)  1 1  1     
Panel (B) – Voting rounds with |L|=3 
Reaching an unanimous vote in voting round … 
Number of voters in a 
group (N = total number  
of groups) 1 2 3 11 13 51 61 103 
1 (N = 5) 5        
2 (N = 6) 5  1      
3 (N = 5) 2 1   1  1  
4 (N = 4)   1 1  1  1 
Panel (C) – Voting behavior in first voting round 
Leverage 
Number 
of voters 
Support for … 
(multiple support 
possible) VCM Punishment Reward 
1st preference = 
actual institution 
|L|=1 71  47 17 28 59 
|L|=3 48  18 8 38 38 
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# Significant difference (p < 0.05) between standard VCM and punishment. 
* Significant difference (p < 0.05) between standard VCM and reward. 
§ Significant difference (p < 0.05) between Punishment and reward. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Average contributions and profits in the endogenous treatments 
 Leverage Standard VCM Punishment Reward 
|L|=1 
5.48#,* 
(N = 25) 
16.13#,§ 
(N = 5) 
8.53*,§ 
(N = 10) Panel (A) – 
Contributions 
|L|=3 
9.17* 
(N = 3) 
- 
14.59* 
(N = 17) 
|L|=1 23.29#,* 29.25#,§ 25.12*,§ 
Panel (B) – Profits 
|L|=3 25.51* - 32.05* 
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Table 6: Vote participation and contributions in the public goods game (censored tobit) 
 Dependent variable: Contributions in … 
Independent variables first period second period overall (Periods 1-10) 
Voter (= 1) 4.01* 2.67 0.95 
Punishment institution (= 1) 5.98** 15.44** 11.91** 
Reward institution (= 1) 5.35* 10.98** 4.15** 
Leverage (= 1 if |L| = 3) -2.09 0.35 5.79** 
Number of voters in group 0.94 0.15 -0.12 
Intercept 3.84* 1.30 4.73* 
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level. 
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Table 7: Punishing or rewarding behavior (panel probit-regression) 
 Dependent variable: Decision to… 
Independent variables punish with |L| = 1 reward with |L| = 1 reward with |L| = 3 
Voter (= 1) -0.173 0.217* 0.340** 
Number of voters in group  0.238* 0.265** -0.054 
Group contribution -0.006** 0.002** 0.013** 
Difference between other 
member’s and own contribution 
-0.098** 0.035** 0.022** 
Observations 600 1200 2040 
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level. 
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Figure 1. Average contributions in the exogenous treatments 
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Figure 2. Punishment in the exogenous treatments 
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Numbers above bars indicate the number of observations. 
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Figure 3. Reward in the exogenous treatments 
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Numbers above bars indicate the number of observations. 
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Figure 4. Average contributions in the endogenous treatments 
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Figure 5. Punishment in the endogenous treatments 
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Numbers above bars indicate the number of observations. 
Note: There are only data for |L|=1 because punishment was never chosen with |L|=3. 
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Figure 6. Reward in the endogenous treatments 
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Numbers above bars indicate the number of observations. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for the endogenous choice with |L| = 3 
(Originally in German –instructions for other treatments are available upon 
request) [not intended for publication; can be made available on our website] 
 
Welcome to the experiment. Please refrain from talking to other participants from now on. 
 
Groups of 4 persons and 10 periods 
At the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned to a group of 4 subjects that will 
remain the same throughout the whole experiment. The whole experiment lasts 10 periods. 
 
Basic decision 
At the beginning of each period you will receive an endowment of 20 tokens. These tokens can be 
allocated into two alternatives, denoted A and B. The sum of the tokens allocated to A and B must 
equal 20. You cannot save any tokens or transfer them to a later period. 
 
Profits from both alternatives 
You will receive the tokens allocated to alternative A back one-to-one as one part of your profit. 
The tokens allocated to alternative B are summed up with the contributions of the other group 
members to alternative B. The sum of all tokens allocated to alternative B in your group is 
multiplied by 1.6 and will be equally distributed– independent of one’s particular contribution – 
among all group members. This means that you – and every other group member – will receive 0.4 
tokens in return (=1.6/4) for every token allocated to alternative B. 
The following figure summarizes the profits from both alternatives. The sum of profits from both 
alternatives gives your total earnings in this period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fraction of the points  
allocated to alternative A 
fraction of the points  
allocated to alternative B 
this sum will be multiplied by 1.6 
profit (individual) 
points of the  
other group members  
allocated to alternative B  
1:0.4
1:1
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Three possible institutions 
Institution number one 
Under this institution you have to make your basic decision only. Your profit per period is as 
described above, depending on how much you have allocated to alternative A and how much the 
group altogether has allocated to alternative B. After the basic decision has been entered by all 
subjects, you will be informed on the next screen about the decisions of all other group members. 
 
Institution number two 
This is the same as institution number one, with the following additional feature: After having 
observed the other members’ contributions you have the option to assign points to other members. 
You can assign points to as many other members as you wish, but you can only assign one point 
per member. Assigning a point has the following consequences: The person assigning a point bears 
the cost of one token (this cost will be subtracted from the period payoff). The person receiving a 
point bears the cost of three tokens (also to be subtracted from her period payoff). 
 
Institution number three 
This is also the same as institution number one, with the following additional feature: After having 
observed the other members’ contributions you have the option to assign points to other members. 
You can assign points to as many other members as you wish, but you can only assign one point 
per member. Assigning a point has the following consequences: The person assigning a point bears 
the cost of one token (this cost will be subtracted from the period payoff). The person receiving a 
point receives three tokens (to be added to her period payoff). 
 
Which institution is valid for your group? 
Before the experiment starts, you have the option to participate in a vote on the institution that will 
be valid in your group for all 10 periods. You are not required to participate in the vote, but even in 
that case the voting outcome in your group will be binding for you as well. Participation in the vote 
has a one-time cost of 10 tokens (which will be subtracted from your first period’s earnings). 
If you participate in the vote you have to indicate for each of the three institutions introduced above 
whether you support this institution (click on “Yes”) or not (click on “No”). You can support as 
many institutions as you want. Before the vote starts, you will see the number of voters in your 
group. When all group members that participate in the vote have made their decisions, you will see 
on a succeeding screen how many group members supported any of the three institutions. 
1. If one and only one institution is unanimously supported by all voters in your group, then this 
institution will be applied for the 10 periods. 
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2. If two or three institutions are unanimously supported, then the institution will be chosen 
randomly from those institutions unanimously supported by all voters in your group. 
3. If no institution has unanimous support, then the voting procedure will be repeated. 
The voting procedure is repeated until the unanimous support of at least one institution is reached. 
If no group member participates in the vote, the institution is chosen randomly with equal 
probabilities for each institution. 
[In order to speed up the voting procedure, we ask you to pay close attention to the status bar where 
you will see either the message “waiting for others” or “please vote”.] 
 
Screen sequences 
In the upper part of the screen you will see your group and subject number. On all screens you will 
also be able to see the prevalent institution in your group. 
Independent of the institution used, you always have to make the basic allocation decision. Then, 
you will be shown the basic decisions of all group members on the next screen. Under institution 
one you will also see the profits. Under institutions two and three you can then enter the points if 
you wish to assign some. As the final screen in institutions two and three of each period, you will 
see again the basic decisions of all group members (linked to their ID) and the sum of points you 
have assigned and received. You are not able to see how many points other group members have 
assigned or received or who has assigned points to you. The profits are calculated as described 
above. 
 
Exchange rate. At the end of the experiment all tokens you have earned are summed up and 
converted in real money at a rate of 10 tokens = 0.40 EURO. 
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Appendix B: Predictions and propositions [not necessarily for 
publication; this material can be made available on our website] 
 
B1.  Theoretic predictions when agents are purely selfish 
B1.1 Standard voluntary contribution mechanism 
The payoff for member i in period t is given by ttiti CcE γπ +−= ,, , where 
∑ == nj tjt cC 1 ,  denotes the sum of contributions within a group. Given that γγ n<<< 10 , 
it follows that the marginal return for member i from investing into the public good is 
negative (since 01/ ,, <+−=∂∂ γπ titi c ). Under the assumptions of selfishness and common 
knowledge of rationality, the only subgame-perfect equilibrium is to contribute zero in 
each single period (i.e. tc ti ∀= 0, ). 
 
B1.2 VCM with punishment or reward 
Since punishment (reward) is costly (both with |L| =1 and |L| = 3), no member will 
ever punish (reward) another member in the second stage of the final period. Hence, 
contributions in the first stage of the final period cannot be affected by the availability of 
punishment (reward). Unraveling the same logic back to the first period yields zero 
contributions as the only subgame-perfect equilibrium. Given that equilibrium 
contributions are identical under all available institutions, it follows that in the endogenous 
treatments all members should abstain from voting in order to save the voting costs. 
 
 
B2.  Theoretic predictions based on the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-model 
The subsequent analysis assumes social preferences of the Fehr-Schmidt type (see 
equation (3) in section 5), and common knowledge of rationality. 
 
B2.1 Standard voluntary contribution mechanism 
 
Proposition 1: Equilibrium contributions in the standard linear VCM depend on the 
distribution of social preferences in a group. If at least one member in a four-person group 
cares relatively little about advantageous inequality (i.e., βi < 0.6), the only equilibrium is 
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complete free-riding (ci,t = 0) of all members. Otherwise, there is a multiplicity of 
equilibria with all members contributing ci,t = c ∈ [0, E]. 
 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show (in their Proposition 4 on p. 839) for the standard 
VCM that 
(a) If γ + βi < 1 for member i, then it is a dominant strategy for that 
member to free-ride and choose ci,t = 0 in all periods. 
(b) Let f denote the number of members with γ + βi < 1, where 0 ≤ f ≤ n. If 
f/(n-1) > γ/2, then there is a unique equilibrium with ci,t = 0 for all 
members i. 
(c) Only if f/(n-1) < (γ + βj – 1)/(αj + βj) for all members j with γ + βj ≥ 1 
(the latter being called ‘cooperators’ in the following), there is a 
multiplicity of equilibria where members with γ + βi < 1 contribute 
zero and the others contribute ci,t = c ∈ [0, E]. Under this condition it 
must hold that (γ + βj – 1)/(αj + βj) < γ/2. 
For the intuition and the formal proofs we refer the reader to Proposition 4 of Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999, p. 839 and pp. 860-863). Note that since in c) we face multiple 
equilibria already in the one-shot game, there might be more equilibria than laid out in c) 
in the finitely repeated game.23 From part (b) it follows for our case with γ = 0.4 and n = 4 
that if f/(n-1) > 0.2 (i.e. the fraction of members with a βi < 0.6 is larger than 20%), there is 
no equilibrium with positive contributions in the repeated standard VCM. This means that 
one member with γ + βi < 1 suffices to wipe out cooperation in the whole group. 
 
 
B2.2 Low leverage (|L| = 1) 
B2.2.1 Punishment 
 
Proposition 2: Consider the VCM with punishment and |L| = 1. Complete free-riding is the 
only equilibrium when at least one group member satisfies βi < 0.6 (which yields the same 
                                                 
23 This reservation is also valid for many of the cases discussed below. 
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prediction as in the VCM). Only if all members satisfy βi ≥ 0.6, any positive contribution 
can be sustained as an equilibrium.24 
 
Let us denote the number of cooperators (who satisfy 1≥+ iβγ ) in a group by n’. 
For reasons of generality, let us define k as the costs of punishing or rewarding another 
subject. Note that k is normalized to unity (k = 1) in our experiment. Consider a strategy 
where all members contribute c > 0 and where all cooperators punish any member who 
contributes cc ti <, . For this strategy to be an equilibrium we must show that (i) it does not 
pay for any member to free-ride and contribute less than c and that (ii) cooperators have an 
incentive to punish those who contribute cc ti <, , i.e. that the punishment threat is credible. 
(i) Free-riding on the other members’ contributions c by choosing cc ti <,  generates a 
monetary gain of )1)(( , γ−− ticc  for the free-rider (relative to those contributing c). If the 
n’ cooperators punish the free-rider, the latter suffers a monetary loss of n’L. The 
maximum gain from a deviation from c is given for 0, =tic . The resulting gain is smaller 
than the loss from being punished as long as the following condition is satisfied. 
 ( )γ−
′=≤
1
Lncc . (B1) 
Hence, no member has an incentive to deviate from contributing c as long as the latter 
condition is fulfilled. What remains to be shown is whether the threat of punishing those 
members who would consider contributing cc ti <,  is credible. 
(ii) For the threat to be credible, a cooperator’s utility from punishing must be larger 
than her utility from not punishing, under the assumption that the other ( )1−′n  cooperators 
stick to their punishment strategy. Hence, we have to check the following inequality for 
member i. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )kn
n
Lncc
n
Lnkcc
n
knn
n
k iiii 1
1
1
11
1
1
−′−−−′−−−−≥′−+−−−−′−−−−
βααα  (B2) 
The first term on the left hand side denotes the costs of punishing a deviating 
member. The second term indicates the disadvantageous inequality towards those members 
who contribute c, but who do not punish deviating members. The third term captures the 
remaining disadvantageous inequality towards the deviating member who gets punished by 
                                                 
24 This latter case is rather unlikely. See Table 2 for details. 
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all n’ cooperators. The first term on the right-hand side denotes the disadvantageous 
inequality towards the deviating member if member i does not punish, but the other n’ – 1 
cooperators punish. The second term is due to the advantageous inequality of member i 
towards the n’ – 1 cooperators who punish. Rearranging and simplifying yields the 
following condition to be satisfied in order to make punishment a credible threat. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]111 −′−−+′−≥ nnnn
k
L
i
i
βα  (B3) 
Note that the left-hand side of equation (B3) yields L/k = 1 in our experiment in the 
low-leverage treatment (|L| = 1). From that it follows that condition (B3) cannot be 
satisfied as long as nn <′ . Hence, the threat of punishment is not credible under |L| = 1 if 
n’ < n. As a consequence, the same predictions as in the standard VCM apply. Only if 
nn =′ , i.e. if all group members are cooperators (with 1≥+ iβγ ), the threat of punishment 
is credible and any contribution level cc ≤  can be enforced. 
 
 
B2.2.2 Reward 
 
Proposition 3: Consider the VCM with reward and |L| = 1. If at least one group member 
satisfies βi < 0.6, zero contributions are the only equilibrium. Only when all members are 
rather averse to advantageous inequality (βi ≥ 0.6 for all i) then positive contributions ci,t 
= c ∈ [0, E] are feasible in equilibrium. Using the reward option can only be part of an 
equilibrium strategy if all members satisfy βi ≥ 0.75.25 
 
Suppose all members contribute [ ]Ec ,0∈ . Note that the n – n’ members with 
1<+ iβγ  will never reward other members. A cooperator, then, has to consider the 
following inequality in order to decide whether to reward (left-hand side) or not (right-
hand side). 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ])1'([
1
1)1'()'(1
1
1)1'( knL
n
nLnnnknL
n
knLn ii −−−−′−−≥−−+−−−−−
βα
 (B4) 
                                                 
25 Obviously, using the reward strategy with |L| ≤ 1 does not increase overall efficiency in terms of monetary 
payoffs. 
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The first term on the left-hand side captures the gains from being rewarded by the 
other n’ – 1 cooperators. The second term shows the costs from rewarding all other 
members. The third term denotes the disadvantageous inequality towards the n – n’ 
members with 1<+ iβγ  who do not reward others. The first term on the right-hand side 
shows again the gains from being rewarded by the other cooperators. The second term 
indicates the advantageous inequality towards those n’ – 1 cooperators. Rearranging terms 
yields the following condition that has to be satisfied in order to make cooperators reward 
the other members. 
 ( ) ( )[ ][ ] 0)1'()'(1
1
11 ≤−−−−+−+− nnnknLnkn ii βα  (B5) 
This condition is never satisfied for n’ < n. Therefore, there are no equilibria in 
which reward is part of the equilibrium strategy. Thus, for n’ < n we have the same set of 
equilibria as in the standard VCM. 
For nn =′  we find that mutual rewarding can be part of an equilibrium strategy. To 
show this, we examine a situation where all members contribute c and reward each other. 
If member i deviates and does not reward the other ( )1−n  members, she saves rewarding 
costs of ( )kn 1− . But at the same time member i suffers from advantageous inequality, 
expressed by ( )[ ] )1(1
1
−−+− nknLn
iβ . Sticking to reward is thus optimal if 
 ( ) ( )[ ]( )11
1
1 −−+−≤− nknLnkn
iβ  (B6) 
For |L| = 1 and k = 1 we must have 75.0≥iβ  for condition (B6) to hold. If all group 
members satisfy 75.06.0 << iβ , any positive contribution ci,t = c ∈ [0, E] can still be 
sustained as an equilibrium, but mutual reward is not part of an equilibrium. 
 
B2.2.3 Voting under the low leverage (|L| = 1) 
 
Proposition 4: Suppose group members can vote between the standard VCM, the VCM 
with punishment, and the VCM with reward under |L| = 1. If voting is costly, subjects do 
not participate in the vote because contributions are expected to be the same for the 
standard VCM and reward or punishment with |L| = 1. 
 
Given the positive costs of voting, Propositions 2 and 3 imply Proposition 4. 
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B2.3 High leverage (|L| = 3) 
B2.3.1 Punishment  
 
Proposition 5: Consider the following strategy in the VCM with punishment and |L| = 3. In 
the first stage of each period each member contributes c∈[0,E]. If all members do so, 
there is no punishment in the second stage. This constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium 
if the following two conditions are satisfied: 
(i) 
'
))(1( ,
n
cc
L ti
−−≥ γ , with ci,t < c denoting a free-rider’s contribution, and 
(ii) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]111 −′−−+′−≥ nnnn
k
L
i
i
βα  for all n’ cooperators. 
The strategy constitutes a continuum of equilibria in the game where γ)Ln'/(cc −=≤ 1  
can be enforced, but where no punishment actually occurs. Consequently, contributions 
are expected to be higher with punishment under |L| = 3 than under |L| = 1 and higher 
than in the standard VCM. 
 
Under the high-leverage |L| = 3 condition (B3) from section B2.2.1 can be satisfied 
even if nn <′  (depending on a member’s iα  and iβ ). Hence, punishment can be a credible 
threat even if not all group members are cooperators. Therefore, it is possible to enforce c . 
All other equilibria discussed for the case of punishment with |L| = 1 remain also valid for 
|L| = 3. 
 
 
B2.3.2 Reward 
 
Proposition 6: Consider the VCM with reward and |L| = 3. Equilibrium predictions 
in this institution are identical to those with reward under |L| = 1. Yet, equilibria where all 
members reward each other are easier to achieve than under |L| = 1 because they require 
βi ≥ 0.6 instead of βi ≥ 0.75 for all members. 
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From condition (B5) in section B2.2.2 it can be seen that even under the high 
leverage treatment it is not possible to enforce any [ ]Ec ,0∈  through the use of rewards, 
since it is better even for cooperators to abstain from rewarding as long as nn <′ . Only if 
nn =′  mutual rewarding can be part of an equilibrium strategy. From condition (B6) and 
the assumption that nn =′  it follows that mutual rewarding is part of an equilibrium 
strategy already if 6.0≥iβ  for all members (which is a less restrictive condition than 
under |L| = 1, where it was necessary to satisfy 75.0≥iβ  for all members). 
 
 
B2.3.3 Voting under the high leverage (|L| = 3) 
 
Proposition 7: Suppose group members can vote between the standard VCM, the VCM 
with punishment, and the VCM with reward under |L| = 3. Assume that the distribution of 
social preferences follows the note in Table 2 as described above. Then, subjects are 
expected to support only the punishment institution and voter turnout will be higher under 
|L| = 3 than under |L| = 1. 
 
Concerning voting behavior in our endogenous treatment under |L| = 3, it is 
important to note first that the punishment institution is the only one in which a 
contribution level c  > 0 can actually be enforced (with the magnitude of c  depending on 
the number of cooperators in the group). In the standard VCM or with reward, positive 
contributions may be sustained in equilibrium, but only if none of the group members 
satisfies βi < 0.6. Taking the distribution of social preferences from Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), 97.4% of four person-groups would have at least one member with βi < 0.6, and 
therefore the only equilibrium would be zero contributions. In the punishment institution, 
though, it suffices to have one subject with βi ≥ 0.6 to be able to enforce a contribution of 
5=c . Given the distributional assumptions from Fehr and Schmidt (1999), about 87% of 
groups should have at least one subject with βi ≥ 0.6. It can be easily verified that for 
almost any meaningful assumption about the distribution of social preferences among 
subjects, it is optimal (in expected terms) to participate in the vote (and incur the one-time 
cost of 10 ECU) and support only the punishment institution. 
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Finally, we note that the voting stage entails a coordination problem. Given our 
approval voting procedure, in equilibrium only one subject per group should go to the 
ballot and vote for the punishment mechanism in |L| = 3 in order to save on voting costs. 
 
 
B3.  Theoretic predictions based on the Charness and Rabin (2002)-
model 
The subsequent analysis assumes (i) that n’’ subjects (henceforth called cooperators) 
out of n group members have social preferences of the Charness-Rabin type (see equation 
(4) in section 5), (ii) ( )''nn −  subjects care only for their own monetary payoff, and (iii) 
common knowledge of rationality applies. 
 
 
B3.1 Standard voluntary contribution mechanism 
 
Proposition 8: Purely selfish players will never contribute positive amounts in the 
standard VCM. Cooperators will contribute their entire endowment to the public good if λi 
≥ 0.5 and λδ 2
11−≤i . 
 
For a purely selfish players it is still a dominant strategy to contribute 0=c , since 
the presence of players with social preferences does not change the incentives for selfish 
players. A cooperator has to determine whether contributing a positive amount increases 
his utility (see equation (4) in section 5) or not. Positive contributions decrease the 
cooperator’s monetary payoff (by γ−1 ), increase the total payoff in the group (by 1−γn ), 
and decrease the minimum payoff in the group (which is the cooperator’s payoff) by γ−1 . 
Taking the derivative of equation (4) with respect to c yields the following inequality 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] 011111 ≥+−−++−++−− γδγδλγλ n . After some rearrangement this 
simplifies to  
 λλ
λδ
2
11
2.1
6.02.1 −=−≤  (B7) 
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From (B7) it follows that the cooperator’s concern for social welfare must satisfy λi 
≥ 0.5, and that iδ  must satisfy particular conditions (in relation to λi) such that a 
cooperator has a positive incentive to contribute. If so, then cooperators contribute their 
full endowment E. if (B7) is not satisfied, all group members contribute zero. 
 
 
B3.2 Punishment 
 
Proposition 9: Consider the VCM with punishment and |L| ≥ 1. The existence of the 
punishment option cannot induce any contributions in excess of those which would also be 
contributed without the availability of punishment. 
 
A selfish player will only cooperate if she is threatened by punishment in case of 
defection. In order to enforce contributions 0>c  from the selfish players, the gain from 
cooperation must exceed the gain from defection (i.e. contributing zero). That is 
LncCECcE ''−−+≥+− γγγ , which yields )1/('' γ−=≤ Lncc  after rearrangement. 
Thus, in general a selfish player has an incentive to contribute cc ≤<0  in case 
punishment by the cooperators is a credible threat. However, if a cooperator decided in the 
second stage to punish the defector she would be worse off than under no punishment, 
because punishment reduces (i) her own payoff, (ii) the minimum payoff in the group, and 
(iii) the group’s total payoff. Thus, punishment cannot constitute a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium in the second stage and cannot induce any contributions in excess to those 
under the VCM. 
 
 
B3.3 Reward 
 
Proposition 10: Consider the VCM with reward and |L| ≥ 1. In the case of L = 3, subjects 
who satisfy 5.0≥iλ  (and thus contribute ci = 20; their number is denoted by n´´) can 
enforce a positive contribution of )1/('' γ−= Lnc  from subjects who care less for social 
welfare (with 5.0<iλ ). This enforcement rests on rewarding the selfish subjects for 
contributing c . For the case of L = 1, the same argument applies, but reward can only be 
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part of an equilibrium strategy (and thus c  can only be enforced) if there are n´´ subjects 
who satisfy the more demanding condition 75.0≥iλ . 
 
Similar to the case of punishment, a selfish player compares the payoff from 
contributing and getting rewarded in the second stage with the payoff from defection in the 
first stage. Therefore, we have to assess the following inequality: 
cCELnCcE γγγ −+≥++− '' . Again, after rearranging, we obtain the condition 
)1/('' γ−=≤ Lncc . Thus, a selfish player cooperates if this condition is fulfilled, i.e. in 
case reward is credible, since then her payoff from cooperation exceeds her payoff from 
defection. 
It remains to be shown whether it constitutes an equilibrium for a cooperator to 
reward ( )1−n  group members in the second stage, even though she will, in turn, only be 
rewarded by the ( )1'' −n  other cooperators in the group. This is equivalent to check whether 
the inequality (B8) holds:26 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ){ }[ ]
( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ){ }[ ]LnnnknLLnnknLLn
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LnnnknLnnknLn
knLn
1'1'11'1'111'
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+−−
≥−+−−−−+−−−
+−−−−
δδλ
λ
δδλ
λ
  (B8) 
After rearrangement and simplification we arrive at condition (B9): 
( )( ) ( )
λ
δλλ −+−−≥ 111 n
k
L
 (B9) 
 
In the low-leverage treatment this is satisfied for [ ]1,0=δ  and [ ]1,43=λ . Similarly, 
in the high-leverage treatment it is satisfied for [ ]1,0=δ  and [ ]1,5.0=λ , provided that 
λδ /35 ≥+ . Hence, as long as λ  and δ  satisfy these conditions, reward constitutes a 
credible incentive to elicit contributions up to c  from selfish players. 
                                                 
26 As the payoff differences occur in the second stage, we omit for simplicity all the variables from the first 
stage that cancel out each other, i.e. cCE γγ ,, . 
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B3.4 Voting under the low leverage (|L| = 1) 
 
Proposition 11: Suppose group members can vote between the standard VCM, the VCM 
with punishment, and the VCM with reward under |L| = 1. If voting costs are sufficiently 
small27, group members with λi ≥ 0.75 participate in the vote and support reward  
 
Propositions 9 and 10 imply Proposition 11. Note again that subjects who care a lot 
for social welfare should participate in the vote in our endogenous treatments and support 
the reward option in order to be able to enforce positive contributions from subjects who 
care little for social welfare (and who do not participate in the vote). This latter group of 
subjects does only contribute in the VCM with reward but not in the standard VCM or the 
VCM with punishment. 
 
 
B3.5 Voting under the high leverage (|L| = 3) 
 
Proposition 12: Suppose group members can vote between the standard VCM, the VCM 
with punishment, and the VCM with reward under |L| = 3. If voting costs are negligible, 
group members with λi ≥ 0.5 participate in the vote and support reward  
 
Again, Propositions 9 and 10 imply Proposition 12. As a final remark, remember that 
given our approval voting procedure, in equilibrium only one subject per group should go 
to the ballot and vote for the reward mechanism in |L| = 3 in order to save on voting costs. 
 
                                                 
27 Note that in our design voting costs were, indeed, small. We are not aware of any calibration results for the 
parameters in the Charness and Rabin (2002)-model. With them it would be possible to weigh voting 
costs against the expected advantage of implementing the reward option. 
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Abstract 
We analyze an experimental public goods game in which group members can 
endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary 
contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group 
members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on 
the level of cooperation in comparison to exogenously implemented institutions. This 
suggests that participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With endogenous 
choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is 
actually more effective in sustaining high levels of cooperation. Our results are 
evaluated against the predictions of social preference models. 
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